Title: Campaign for Democray, but toward what End?
Nature: Political (from English to Chinese)
Written by: Suzanne Pepper 胡素珊
眾所周知，投票是民主最基本和重要的一環。群眾投票時的選擇可決定結果之餘，選民決定誰人奪得這些議席，從而這些代議士代表我們去管治我們的民生事務。誠然，香港推行行政主導，選民選出來代表只擁有有限的權力。故此，我們不可與西方民主中政府與人民之間的契約同日而語，而該契約是由普通的一票確認和定期更新。香港從未曾採用民主制度，而那制度是從未曾這般實踐過 。但基本法容許賦予競選代表某些重要權力，而該權力可在 2008 立法會行使，可決定香港之政制改革演變為普選 。好像具有重大意義的「二十三條立法」，據稱會在曾蔭權於2012年任期屆滿前再次出台。
可以肯定的說，不是所有政治玩家皆會瞎著眼去接受任務，但一定程度的危險仍存在 。香港與北京政府官員公開透露新一屆立法會為香港的政治演變設定典範。他-們解釋：因為立法會議員必須從眾多具爭議性的提案選擇其一，而該提案可望為香港由現在及2017年 至 2020年實行普選有所定奪。政治家和政策評論員從長計議，若果泛民失去關鍵的 21席， 這些小眾/小撮人不單只無力阻止由官方提出的政改提案，民主派更失去影響大局的能力。
重要的是公眾的資訊終於完結。投票者必須猜測或憑直覺判斷其他候選人，因為一小撮人好像知悉其他候選 人的詳情，而那些詳情仍未出現在任何選舉宣傳品上。緊接著的是如果候選人主動為自己動員，民主派人士須展現出更強的壓迫感。在這大前提下，公眾必須對其他[候選人?]更加理解，那些是被[一年前/2007年]政府推行的《香港政制綠皮書》內的細節而弄得朦朧不清。他們更被所有政黨在沒法解釋如何做決定的長期影響下，被弄得晦暗不明。
長期的影響
政府須要把議題故弄玄虛是可以理解的。它的工作是以玲瓏手腕處理香港的政治演變，確保反對派及支持派的表現恰當。民主派失敗的原因不大明顯是因為他們大部分沒有放棄承諾。他們看來只是不能忍受兩個制度過度為一個制度，所以當道路改道及變得急切時，他們不能轉變。特別是泛民繼續相信過去的「一國兩制」。相反，所有政府的經濟與政治計劃皆是未來主導，方針明顯地把香港舒緩及引流為「一國一制」。
以政治論調和選舉辭令的意義是什麼？它意指民主派永不討論[遊戲的]尾聲，也從不詢問對手關於基本法第5條，因基本法第5條曾應允可保持香港的「生活模式」50 年不變。「生活模式」包括經濟及社會自由，但亦包括香港一些長久已成為理所當然的東西。對於司法獨立、法律建制、表達自由多方面會有什麼發展？這些可形成中國內地與香港所謂的「制度」之間最明顯的落差。親政府的候選人是否願意處理這類問題？我們不會知悉，因為這些問題從未被提問過，若曾提出過，也起碼不是在公眾場合。
現階段來看，這些問題特別迫切，因為成功的候選人在九月將必會被問及在他們2012年任期結束前，是否考慮把基本法 23條重新立法；以及他們在大是大非上的意見，是他們對有關立法議題的指標。原本的立法包括對香港的慣性自由，公眾更須要知道候選人現時在相同議題上所持的立場。
政改選擇
在這些長期影響下，候選人須要討論政治改革的其他選擇，因為立法會的設定就是在2008年至 2012年期間的投票，將會決定那位立法會議員可在往後的日子繼續他的議席。實際上，北京於2007年12月已嚴謹地劃清界線，作一些可行選擇，就是直至分別在2017年及 2020年才有立法會和行政長官的普選。在政府發表的《香港政制綠皮書》和相關策略議題上，仍可看到這些蛛絲馬跡。
撇開混淆來說，《綠皮書》實實在在指出香港面對的選擇。 行政長官的選舉比較上沒有如此煩擾，事因被提名者必須 符合北京的事先準許，而這向來是已知的決案(GP: 2.08.ii; 3.40)。最重要的是，現今的立法會選舉詳細說明這是立法會演變的選擇。根據北京於2007年12月所作的決議，整個議會不排除直到2020年的普選只留下兩個選擇。
兩個餘下的選擇是：保留原有功能組別議席、或增加由地區議員非直接選舉的立法會議席(GP: 409, ff)。這通常是單一席位。《香港政制綠皮書》提案甚至鼓吹保留某些有趣的功能組別議席，作為普選的永久配合，儘管沒有解釋顯顯然的矛盾。在外國關於選舉議席的建議至少與預視為間接選舉，通常被認為是公投或普選(GP: 2.24)。
大部分民主派人士鍾情後者的選擇，正是於2005年政府引進，但可惜繼而流產的政改方案。但鼓吹派人士仍為公眾提供一張好處和壞處並存的清單。特別地，我們較難看到民主派人士從這安排而得益，尤其是2007年11月的地區選舉後，他們已失去於2003年得到的額外影響。親政黨派的出選代表包括民建聯、自由黨、及公民力量，現擁有香港十八區內兩區大半數的支持。
在這層面上，支持北京的民建聯已變成主導位置，它更小心翼翼地不再明顯地解釋與草根階層建設緊密聯繫的網絡、聯盟和代理人。可能的原因是，若立法會是非直接經由地區選舉，這般安排會將香港直接與內地的「人大代表大會」聯繫。這做法建基於草根階層，由非直接的普選開始，與共產黨普遍傳播，由上而下嚴格挑選出來的候選人。在2007年11月，所有民建聯的候選人及聯盟在平台上傾巢而出地亮相，他們只著眼於民生，卻不論政。他們狂風掃落葉式的勝利把他們置於優越地位，這樣的政治利益是建基於從地區議會非直接選出的立法會成員所立法及改革。我們期待的是，選民在2008年9月7 日當天可以去投票站投下一票，而他們可以獲得比去年(2007年)11月有關選民多些細節資料。
西方的民主制度早已肯定在選舉過程、政治制度及政府機制裡保證市民享有的權利及自由。可惜香港受制於行政主導及有限選舉的狀況下，選民並不了解這一種關係的重要性，只有依靠候選人提醒民眾及選民的覺醒，從而在這一種關係下造成的危害性才可望避免。
ORIGINAL (English):
Campaigning for Democracy, but toward what end? (by Suzanne Pepper)
As everyone knows, voting is the most basic and important aspect of democracy. People vote and their choices matter. They determine who occupies the institutions that make decisions governing our lives. Of course, in Hong Kong’s executive-led system, elected representatives have limited powers in that respect. Hence we cannot speak in customary Western democratic terms of a contract between government and citizens that is confirmed and renewed regularly by a popular vote. Hong Kong has never had such a democratic system and it may never be governed in that way. But the Basic Law allows elected representatives some important powers nonetheless. Those to be exercised during the tenure of the 2008 Legislative Council will determine the design of Hong Kong’s constitutional evolution toward universal suffrage, as well as the all-important Article 23 legislation, which is reportedly to be re-introduced before Donald Tsang’s term of office ends in 2012.
Hence despite the political pessimism now widely prevalent, voting is still important and its most significant aspect is not just whether the electorate is able to express its will freely and fairly in terms of electoral rules and regulations. Even more crucial is whether voters have the ability to make informed choices. Since Hong Kong’s elections are well managed and the population well educated, the main question mark surrounding the ability to make informed choices concerns the specific political knowledge and information available to the electorate ahead of the coming Legislative Council poll. This is because no Legco election to date has been more important for Hong Kong’s political future, and none has been so poorly explained to the electorate. Public political discourse appears to have stagnated in Hong Kong around about 2004, even as the political system itself has continued to evolve under the more watchful eyes of Beijing officialdom. Yet if ever a political reality check was needed, it is now before voters head to the polls on September 7th. Best and worst case scenarios need to be spelled out and some creative fall-back alternatives presented if the worst befalls democratic candidates, which it very well might.
To be sure, not all the political players are blind to the issues at stake, but therein lies the danger. Hong Kong and Beijing government officials say openly that the new Legco will set the course for Hong Kong’s political evolution ever after. They also say why: because legislators must choose among competing proposals that will determine what kind of universal suffrage system Hong Kong can work toward between now and 2017-2020. Politicians and commentators note further that if pan-democrats lose the crucial 21-seat minority needed to block constitutional reform proposals, democrats will also have lost the ability to influence those decisions.
But there the public’s information essentially ends. Voters must either guess or intuit the rest because few seem to be aware of the attendant details, which have yet to appear in anyone’s campaign literature. It follows that if constituents are to be mobilized on their behalf, democrats need to instill a greater sense of urgency than is currently apparent. Toward that end, the public needs to be clear about the alternatives [what alternatives?], which are obscured by the mesmerizing detail of the government’s Green Paper on Constitutional Development issued a year ago. They are also obscured by the failure of all parties to explain the long-term implications of the choices to be made.
LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS
That the government should obfuscate the issues is understandable. Its job is to finesse Hong Kong’s political evolution by minimizing opposition and all pro-government parties behave accordingly. The reason for democrats’ failure is less obvious because most have not abandoned their commitments. Rather they seem simply to have lost their bearings in the transition from two systems to one, and so they are unable to shift gears even as the road turns and the necessity of adjusting become more urgent. Specifically, pan-democrats continue to think in terms of the one-country, two-systems past. In contrast, all government economic and political planning is future-oriented and clearly aimed at easing Hong Kong into the slipstream of one-country, one-system.
What does this mean in terms of local political discourse and campaign rhetoric? It means that democrats never discuss the endgame and never ask their opponents what Article 5 of the Basic Law means when it promises that Hong Kong’s “way-of-life” shall remain unchanged for 50 years. Way-of-life includes economic and social freedoms. But it also includes certain other customs that Hong Kong has always taken for granted. What will happen to judicial independence, the rule of law, and freedom of expression in all its many forms? These remain the most distinctive points of difference between the mainland and Hong Kong “systems.” Are pro-government candidates willing to address such questions? We do not know because they have never been asked, at least not in public.
These questions are especially urgent now because successful candidates in September will almost certainly be asked to consider the new Article 23 legislation before their terms end in 2012 and their views on the larger questions are important indicators of how they will scrutinize related bills. The original legislation contained many points contrary to Hong Kong’s customary freedoms and the public needs to know where candidates stand today on those same points.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES
Given these long-term implications, candidates should also be discussing the political reform alternatives since the designs for Legco, to be voted on during the 2008-2012 term, will determine what kinds of legislators are seated there in all the years to come. In fact, the available alternatives have already been severely circumscribed by Beijing’s December 2007 decision that forbids universal suffrage elections for the Chief Executive and Legco until 2017 and 2020, respectively. Some clues are nevertheless provided in the government’s Green Paper on Constitutional Development and in the related strategic discussions.
Despite its obfuscation, the Green Paper actually spells out the options available to Hong Kong in very clear terms. The chief executive election is less problematic because the nominees must meet with Beijing’s prior approval, which has always been a foregone conclusion (GP: 2.08.ii; 3.40). More important now, during the current election campaign, are the alternatives spelled out for Legco’s evolution. Only two remain since universal suffrage elections for the whole chamber were ruled out until 2020 by Beijing’s December 2007 decision.
The two remaining choices are: either retain Functional Constituency seats; or increase the number of Legco seats indirectly-elected by District Councillors (GP: 4.09, ff.). There is currently only one such seat. The Green Paper proposals even advocate retaining some of the special-interest Functional Constituency seats as a permanent companion for universal suffrage, albeit without explaining the apparent contradiction. The proposal for indirectly-elected seats at least comes with the caveat that indirect elections are commonly regarded in overseas jurisdictions as a form of universal suffrage (GP: 2.24).
Many democrats favor this latter alternative, which was introduced as part of the government’s abortive 2005 political reform package. But advocates have yet to offer the public a full list of its pros and cons. In particular, it is difficult to see how democrats could benefit from this arrangement when they have, especially after the November 2007 District Councils election, lost what extra influence they had gained at that level in 2003. Elected representatives from pro-government parties including the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), the Liberal Party, and Civic Force now hold solid majorities in all but two of Hong Kong’s 18 District Councils.
At this level, the pro-Beijing DAB has become the dominant force and it has been careful not to articulate its reasons for building so dense a grassroots network of connections, allies, and surrogates. Perhaps it is because if Legco were to be indirectly elected by District Councillors, the arrangement would put Hong Kong directly on course to join the mainland National Peoples’ Congress system. This is based on universal suffrage at the grassroots level, with indirect elections form there on up, with the all-pervasive Chinese Communist Party vetting candidates from top to bottom. In November 2007, all DAB candidates and allies ran on platforms that focused exclusively on livelihood issues and did not refer to anything political. Yet the result of their sweeping victories now place them in a position to reap a preponderance of political benefit from any reform based on the indirect election of Legco members by District Councillors. We can only hope that by September 7th, voters will be able to go to the polls with more of the details necessary to make informed choices than the electorate had at its disposal last November.
also available at: http://www.citizenscommission.hk (August 2008)
