Showing posts with label My translation 我的翻譯. Show all posts
Showing posts with label My translation 我的翻譯. Show all posts

Thursday, December 31, 2015

efarm - signages, display boards (Sep - Dec 2015)

 


 


 

Friday, December 20, 2013

推動民主的終極目標在何處? Campaign for Democracy, but toward what end? (Aug 2008)



Title: Campaign for Democray, but toward what End?

Nature: Political (from English to Chinese)
 
Organization: The Professional Commons 公共專業聯盟
 
Title: Campaign for Democracy, but toward what end?

Written by: Suzanne Pepper 胡素珊
 
推動民主終極目標在何處?

眾所周知,投票是民主最基本和重要的一環。群眾投票時的選擇可決定結果之餘,選民決定誰人奪得這些議席,從而這些代議士代表我們去管治我們的民生事務。誠然,香港推行行政主導,選民選出來代表只擁有有限的權力。故此,我們不可與西方民主中政府與人民之間的契約同日而語,而該契約是由普通的一票確認和定期更新。香港從未曾採用民主制度,而那制度是從未曾這般實踐過 。但基本法容許賦予競選代表某些重要權力,而該權力可在 2008 立法會行使,可決定香港之政制改革演變為普選 。好像具有重大意義的「二十三條立法」,據稱會在曾蔭權於2012年任期屆滿前再次出台。
 
縱然現在的政治悲觀論調廣泛 流傳,投票仍是重要,因為選民固然在遵守法律的原則下可以公平及自由地選擇合適的人選。更關鍵的是投票者有能力作出明確的結果。由於香港的選舉的管理完善,一般人的教育水平高,主要問題是這一班選民能夠在投票之前能否知悉對於協助其作出選擇的政治知識及資訊,皆因民眾認為立法會選舉對香港政治前途已不大重要,再加上以往立法會欠缺交待所致。公眾的政治議論似乎倒流至大約2004年的時候,即北京當局仍在其緊密的監視下讓香港的政治體制演進的景況。可是,即使政治現實的考量是需要,直至在97 日正式投票的時候,好與壞的情景也需要推測出來,即使泛民的候選人面對惡劣的環境,也許一些富有創意的點子是可以把情況逆轉過來。

可以肯定的說,不是所有政治玩家皆會瞎著眼去接受任務,但一定程度的危險仍存在 。香港與北京政府官員公開透露新一屆立法會為香港的政治演變設定典範。他-們解釋:因為立法會議員必須從眾多具爭議性的提案選擇其一,而該提案可望為香港由現在及2017 2020年實行普選有所定奪。政治家和政策評論員從長計議,若果泛民失去關鍵的 21席, 這些小眾/小撮人不單只無力阻止由官方提出的政改提案,民主派更失去影響大局的能力。

重要的是公眾的資訊終於完結。投票者必須猜測或憑直覺判斷其他候選人,因為一小撮人好像知悉其他候選 人的詳情,而那些詳情仍未出現在任何選舉宣傳品上。緊接著的是如果候選人主動為自己動員,民主派人士須展現出更強的壓迫感。在這大前提下,公眾必須對其他[候選人?]更加理解,那些是被[一年前/2007]政府推行的《香港政制綠皮書》內的細節而弄得朦朧不清他們更被所有政黨在沒法解釋如何做決定的長期影響下,被弄得晦暗不明

長期的影響

政府須要把議題故弄玄虛是可以理解的。它的工作是以玲瓏手腕處理香港的政治演變,確保反對派及支持派的表現恰當。民主派失敗的原因不大明顯是因為他們大部分沒有放棄承諾。他們看來只是不能忍受兩個制度過度為一個制度,所以當道路改道及變得急切時,他們不能轉變。特別是泛民繼續相信過去的「一國兩制」。相反,所有政府的經濟與政治計劃皆是未來主導,方針明顯地把香港舒緩及引流為「一國一制」。

以政治論調和選舉辭令的意義是什麼?它意指民主派永不討論[遊戲的]尾聲,也從不詢問對手關於基本法第5條,因基本法第5條曾應允可保持香港的「生活模式」50 年不變。「生活模式」包括經濟及社會自由,但亦包括香港一些長久已成為理所當然的東西。對於司法獨立、法律建制、表達自由多方面會有什麼發展?這些可形成中國內地與香港所謂的「制度」之間最明顯的落差。親政府的候選人是否願意處理這類問題?我們不會知悉,因為這些問題從未被提問過,若曾提出過,也起碼不是在公眾場合。

現階段來看,這些問題特別迫切,因為成功的候選人在九月將必會被問及在他們2012年任期結束前,是否考慮把基本法 23條重新立法;以及他們在大是大非上的意見,是他們對有關立法議題的指標。原本的立法包括對香港的慣性自由,公眾更須要知道候選人現時在相同議題上所持的立場。

政改選擇

在這些長期影響下,候選人須要討論政治改革的其他選擇,因為立法會的設定就是在2008年至 2012年期間的投票,將會決定那位立法會議員可在往後的日子繼續他的議席。實際上,北京於200712月已嚴謹地劃清界線,作一些可行選擇,就是直至分別在2017年及 2020年才有立法會和行政長官的普選。在政府發表的《香港政制綠皮書》和相關策略議題上,仍可看到這些蛛絲馬跡。

撇開混淆來說,《綠皮書》實實在在指出香港面對的選擇。 行政長官的選舉比較上沒有如此煩擾,事因被提名者必須 符合北京的事先準許,而這向來是已知的決案(GP: 2.08.ii; 3.40)。最重要的是,現今的立法會選舉說明是立法會演變的選擇。根據北京於200712月所作的決議,整個議會不排除直到2020年的普選只留下兩個選擇。

兩個餘下的選擇是:保留原有功能組別議席、或增加由地區議員非直接選舉的立法會議席(GP: 409, ff)。這通常是單一席位。《香港政制綠皮書》提案甚至鼓吹保留某些有趣的功能組別議席,作為普選的永久配合,儘管沒有解釋顯顯然的矛盾。在外國關於選舉議席的建議至少與預視為間接選舉,通常被認為是公投或普選(GP: 2.24)

大部分民主派人士鍾情後者的選擇,正是於2005年政府引進,但可惜繼而流產的政改方案。但鼓吹派人士仍為公眾提供一張好處和壞處並存的清單。特別地,我們較難看到民主派人士從這安排而得益,尤其是200711月的地區選舉後,他們已失去於2003年得到的額外影響。親政黨派的出選代表包括民建聯、自由黨、及公民力量,現擁有香港十八區內兩區大半數的支持。

在這層面上,支持北京的民建聯已變成主導位置,它更小心翼翼地不再明顯地解釋與草根階層建設緊密聯繫的網絡、聯盟和代理人。可能的原因是,若立法會是非直接經由地區選舉,這般安排會將香港直接與內地的「人大代表大會」聯繫。這做法建基於草根階層,由非直接的普選開始,與共產黨普遍傳播,由上而下嚴格挑選出來的候選人。在200711月,所有民建聯的候選人及聯盟在平台上傾巢而出地亮相,他們只著眼於民生,卻不論政。他們狂風掃落葉式的勝利把他們置於優越地位,這樣的政治利益是建基於從地區議會非直接選出的立法會成員所立法及改革。我們期待的是,選民在200897 日當天可以去投票站投下一票,而他們可以獲得比去年(2007)11月有關選民多些細節資料。

西方的民主制度早已肯定在選舉過程、政治制度及政府機制裡保證市民享有的權利及自由。可惜香港受制於行政主導及有限選舉的狀況下,選民並不了解這一種關係的重要性,只有依靠候選人提醒民眾及選民的覺醒,從而在這一種關係下造成的危害性才可望避免。
ORIGINAL (English):
Campaigning for Democracy, but toward what end? (by Suzanne Pepper)

As everyone knows, voting is the most basic and important aspect of democracy. People vote and their choices matter. They determine who occupies the institutions that make decisions governing our lives. Of course, in Hong Kong’s executive-led system, elected representatives have limited powers in that respect. Hence we cannot speak in customary Western democratic terms of a contract between government and citizens that is confirmed and renewed regularly by a popular vote. Hong Kong has never had such a democratic system and it may never be governed in that way. But the Basic Law allows elected representatives some important powers nonetheless. Those to be exercised during the tenure of the 2008 Legislative Council will determine the design of Hong Kong’s constitutional evolution toward universal suffrage, as well as the all-important Article 23 legislation, which is reportedly to be re-introduced before Donald Tsang’s term of office ends in 2012.

Hence despite the political pessimism now widely prevalent, voting is still important and its most significant aspect is not just whether the electorate is able to express its will freely and fairly in terms of electoral rules and regulations. Even more crucial is whether voters have the ability to make informed choices. Since Hong Kong’s elections are well managed and the population well educated, the main question mark surrounding the ability to make informed choices concerns the specific political knowledge and information available to the electorate ahead of the coming Legislative Council poll. This is because no Legco election to date has been more important for Hong Kong’s political future, and none has been so poorly explained to the electorate. Public political discourse appears to have stagnated in Hong Kong around about 2004, even as the political system itself has continued to evolve under the more watchful eyes of Beijing officialdom. Yet if ever a political reality check was needed, it is now before voters head to the polls on September 7th. Best and worst case scenarios need to be spelled out and some creative fall-back alternatives presented if the worst befalls democratic candidates, which it very well might.

To be sure, not all the political players are blind to the issues at stake, but therein lies the danger. Hong Kong and Beijing government officials say openly that the new Legco will set the course for Hong Kong’s political evolution ever after. They also say why: because legislators must choose among competing proposals that will determine what kind of universal suffrage system Hong Kong can work toward between now and 2017-2020. Politicians and commentators note further that if pan-democrats lose the crucial 21-seat minority needed to block constitutional reform proposals, democrats will also have lost the ability to influence those decisions.

But there the public’s information essentially ends. Voters must either guess or intuit the rest because few seem to be aware of the attendant details, which have yet to appear in anyone’s campaign literature. It follows that if constituents are to be mobilized on their behalf, democrats need to instill a greater sense of urgency than is currently apparent. Toward that end, the public needs to be clear about the alternatives [what alternatives?], which are obscured by the mesmerizing detail of the government’s Green Paper on Constitutional Development issued a year ago. They are also obscured by the failure of all parties to explain the long-term implications of the choices to be made.

LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS

That the government should obfuscate the issues is understandable. Its job is to finesse Hong Kong’s political evolution by minimizing opposition and all pro-government parties behave accordingly. The reason for democrats’ failure is less obvious because most have not abandoned their commitments. Rather they seem simply to have lost their bearings in the transition from two systems to one, and so they are unable to shift gears even as the road turns and the necessity of adjusting become more urgent. Specifically, pan-democrats continue to think in terms of the one-country, two-systems past. In contrast, all government economic and political planning is future-oriented and clearly aimed at easing Hong Kong into the slipstream of one-country, one-system.

What does this mean in terms of local political discourse and campaign rhetoric? It means that democrats never discuss the endgame and never ask their opponents what Article 5 of the Basic Law means when it promises that Hong Kong’s “way-of-life” shall remain unchanged for 50 years. Way-of-life includes economic and social freedoms. But it also includes certain other customs that Hong Kong has always taken for granted. What will happen to judicial independence, the rule of law, and freedom of expression in all its many forms? These remain the most distinctive points of difference between the mainland and Hong Kong “systems.” Are pro-government candidates willing to address such questions? We do not know because they have never been asked, at least not in public.

These questions are especially urgent now because successful candidates in September will almost certainly be asked to consider the new Article 23 legislation before their terms end in 2012 and their views on the larger questions are important indicators of how they will scrutinize related bills. The original legislation contained many points contrary to Hong Kong’s customary freedoms and the public needs to know where candidates stand today on those same points.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES

Given these long-term implications, candidates should also be discussing the political reform alternatives since the designs for Legco, to be voted on during the 2008-2012 term, will determine what kinds of legislators are seated there in all the years to come. In fact, the available alternatives have already been severely circumscribed by Beijing’s December 2007 decision that forbids universal suffrage elections for the Chief Executive and Legco until 2017 and 2020, respectively. Some clues are nevertheless provided in the government’s Green Paper on Constitutional Development and in the related strategic discussions.

Despite its obfuscation, the Green Paper actually spells out the options available to Hong Kong in very clear terms. The chief executive election is less problematic because the nominees must meet with Beijing’s prior approval, which has always been a foregone conclusion (GP: 2.08.ii; 3.40). More important now, during the current election campaign, are the alternatives spelled out for Legco’s evolution. Only two remain since universal suffrage elections for the whole chamber were ruled out until 2020 by Beijing’s December 2007 decision.

The two remaining choices are: either retain Functional Constituency seats; or increase the number of Legco seats indirectly-elected by District Councillors (GP: 4.09, ff.). There is currently only one such seat. The Green Paper proposals even advocate retaining some of the special-interest Functional Constituency seats as a permanent companion for universal suffrage, albeit without explaining the apparent contradiction. The proposal for indirectly-elected seats at least comes with the caveat that indirect elections are commonly regarded in overseas jurisdictions as a form of universal suffrage (GP: 2.24).

Many democrats favor this latter alternative, which was introduced as part of the government’s abortive 2005 political reform package. But advocates have yet to offer the public a full list of its pros and cons. In particular, it is difficult to see how democrats could benefit from this arrangement when they have, especially after the November 2007 District Councils election, lost what extra influence they had gained at that level in 2003. Elected representatives from pro-government parties including the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), the Liberal Party, and Civic Force now hold solid majorities in all but two of Hong Kong’s 18 District Councils.
At this level, the pro-Beijing DAB has become the dominant force and it has been careful not to articulate its reasons for building so dense a grassroots network of connections, allies, and surrogates. Perhaps it is because if Legco were to be indirectly elected by District Councillors, the arrangement would put Hong Kong directly on course to join the mainland National Peoples’ Congress system. This is based on universal suffrage at the grassroots level, with indirect elections form there on up, with the all-pervasive Chinese Communist Party vetting candidates from top to bottom. In November 2007, all DAB candidates and allies ran on platforms that focused exclusively on livelihood issues and did not refer to anything political. Yet the result of their sweeping victories now place them in a position to reap a preponderance of political benefit from any reform based on the indirect election of Legco members by District Councillors. We can only hope that by September 7th, voters will be able to go to the polls with more of the details necessary to make informed choices than the electorate had at its disposal last November.
 
In Western-style democracies, the electoral process, political system, and institutions of government embody and guarantee the rights and freedoms held to be self-evident. That such a means-ends relationship is not clearly apparent to the electorate in Hong Kong is one of the dangers of its executive-led partially-elected system. That danger can only be deflected if candidates raise the alarm and voters heed the warning.
also available at: http://www.citizenscommission.hk (August 2008)

為殘疾人士創造就業機會及落實最低工資 (Jan 2010)


Title:
為殘疾人士創造就業機會及落實最低工資

Creating Employment Opportunities for the Disabled Persons &
Realization of Minimum Wages

Nature: Social issue (from Chinese to English)
 
Research Unit:
社區發展動力培育
Community Development Initiative Foundation
Researchers:張超雄博士,蘇恒泰先生Dr Fernando Chiu-Hung Cheung & Mr Rex So Hang-Tai
 
Date: January 2010
==========================================


1. 引言
1. Introduction
 
1.1 經勞工界和基層團體多年的爭取,最低工資已開始展開立法程序,相信香港在不久將來應可落實最低工資。不過,仍有部份商界人士和勞顧會的資方代表表示最低工資只會增加成本,變相影響勞工的就業機會。而過去普遍不太願意聘用殘疾人士的部分資方代表更表示,如將殘疾人士納入最低工資的保障範圍,僱主極可能因此而棄用殘疾人士,令殘疾人士的就業情況更為困難。為此,有商界人士主張最低工資應豁免殘疾人士,以保障他們的就業機會。
1.1 After years of battle by the labour sector and public entities, the issue of minimum wages is already in the process of legislation. It is believed that the realization of minimum wages is possible in the near future of Hong Kong . However, there are still some representatives from the commercial sector and the employers of Labour Advisory Board who consider it would increase the costs, which may subsequently affect the employment opportunities of the employees. For those employers who are not willing to recruit disabled persons have even indicated that, they may minimize the chances of recruiting them if they are under the protection of minimum wages. Incidentally, it may worsen the employment opportunities of disabled persons. Hence, some representatives from the commercial sector have proposed that the disabled persons should be exempted from the protection of minimum wages, with a view to protect their employment opportunities.

2. 殘疾人士的現況
2. Current Situation of Disabled Persons

3. 政府現行鼓勵殘疾人士就業的政策
3. HKSAR Government’s Current Policies on Motivating Disabled Persons for Employment

4. 為殘疾人士提供收入保障的需要
4. To Provide Income Protection for the Disabled Persons

5. 結語:創造就業及最低工資需同步進行
5. Conclusion: Synchronization of Creating Employment and Minimum Wages
5.1 工資偏低和就業機會不足同樣是殘疾人士目前面對的就業難題。如只推行最低工資,僱主定必捨難取易,放棄聘用殘疾人士,令他們僅餘的就業機會也付諸東流。若就業配額得不到最低工資的配合,殘疾人士定必成為顧主們壓價的對象。因此,我們堅決認為兩者缺一不可,必需同時執行。若有人問殘疾人士需要的是合理工資,還是僅有的工作機會?我們會回答:兩者皆要!因為工作是所有人的基本權利,而合理工資是社會公義的踐行。希望政府在制訂政策時,不要漠視殘疾人士目前面臨的困境。
 
5.1 Low income and inadequate employment opportunities are the major problems for disabled persons currently. If only “minimum wages” is imposed, employers must prefer the easy option which is to abandon recruiting the disabled persons, thus it must deprive of their employment opportunities. If the employment quota is not compatible with the minimum wages, disabled persons must be the subjects to be deprived by the potential employers. Therefore, CDIF strongly believe that the two issues must be executed at the same time. If anyone is asking whether the disabled persons should be provided with reasonable wages or the provision of employment opportunities alone, we would answer: “both”! It is because employment is the basic rights for everyone, thus reasonable wages is the implementation of social justice. CDIF hope when the government is legislating the policies, they should not ignore the current difficulties the disabled persons are facing.

 

Saturday, July 14, 2007

菲爾德: 希臘悲劇的永恆輪迴與當代震撼 (文研文)



Theatrum Issue 1 文研文 第一期 (June 2007)
多謝歐贊年 (Jeffrey Au) 的穿針引線及「修補」,得而為這文學作品沾上點邊兒。若Prof Jeremy Tambling懂得中文的話,希望他喜歡我的翻譯!
錯過了APA 的四月重演,唯有再期待!
http://www.actualvoice.com

簡介《菲爾德》
Jeremy Tambling, University of Manchester 英國曼徹斯特大學文學系教授
翻譯:譚情/譚心
《菲爾德》是法國著名編劇尚.哈辛的一齣悲劇,主題是關於嫉妒,尤其是女性的嫉妒,或羨慕(兩者有分別嗎?),當然也包括愛情這個元素來突顯其荒謬性。這種荒謬性亦透過戲劇探討的秩序與尊嚴呈現出來,當中的語言運用亦斷定了自控及受控的必須性 (這形式呈現了哈辛貫徹使用對稱詩句,與莎士比亞剛好相反)。秩序井然的劇情,不變的佈局:世間萬物跟隨定律運行,與劇中的澎湃激情形成對照。
** 哈辛 **
尚.哈辛 (1639-1699)曾編寫了十一齣舞台劇,被公認為法國古典悲劇的典範。他的作品曾在巴黎布爾崗戲院上演,劇院於1680年改為巴黎國家大劇院。哈辛自幼在Port-Royal修道院長大,接受詹森主義者的教導──雖然是天主教徒,詹森主義者信奉加爾文主義,認為凡夫俗子幹盡壞事,他們的惡行全都是不可原諒的。詹森主義者當然不會在戲劇上浪費時間,故詹森主義者對戲劇的反對也可能構成哈辛的分裂思想。哈辛創作了《菲爾德》後回到詹森主義者前,他們對哈辛的罪孽觀念大感興趣,如同菲爾德基本的性格 (她既沉迷其中又深感後悔),他們亦對無法獲得救贖感興趣。
** 神話 **
古希臘時代,菲爾德是雅典王泰西的妻子,Ariadne的姊妹。雅麗斯曾協助泰西在迷宮殺掉一頭半人半牛的怪物米諾托。泰西捨棄了雅麗斯而娶了菲爾德為妻。菲爾德當上皇后,什麼也垂手可得,可惜她迷戀繼子依保列德;他是泰西與前妻亞馬遜皇后安緹奧所生的太子。亞馬遜族人不會與任何人建立感情,直至泰西征服亞馬遜族人後。眾所周知,依保列德不會討好女人,他只醉心狩獵和策馬馳騁的樂趣。古希臘時代的人民,以駕馭馬匹的能力象徵成功控制一己的情感。哈辛從另一位希臘悲劇作家尤里庇得斯 (公元前484-407年)在《依保列德》一劇中(公元前428年)取得靈感。愛慾女神愛芙羅黛蒂懲罰依保列德,只因他拒絕了她的一往情深。在尤里庇得斯的悲劇中,依保列德因為情感帶來毀滅性力量而備受困擾,尤里庇得斯相信人類的感情失控是危險的,是一場禍害。相對於尤里庇得斯的悲劇世界而言,菲爾德就顯得微不足道。
環觀尚.哈辛的戲劇,神靈並沒有在其舞台上出現過,從特洛溱來的女人開場白亦沒有出現過,更沒有呈現幽閉恐怖症,如依保列德與雅典公主雅麗斯的相戀。她的國家一直與泰西皇朝競爭不斷。雅麗斯被禁止與依保列德戀愛,因她的家族與泰西家族是宿敵。諷刺的是,貫穿整齣戲劇的便是禁戀,像菲爾德對依保列德泥足深陷的迷戀也是另一段禁戀。

** 駭人的愛 **
戲劇甫開始,依保列德正打算從雅典南部的特洛溱逃離,因他邂逅了雅麗斯,害怕自己被她深深吸引。同時他卻逃避菲爾德的痴戀,他與她的家族亦是世仇。此時泰西已消失其蹤影,更有消息傳出他已死掉,菲爾德不顧危險把握機會向依保列德示愛。最震驚的時刻在第二幕第五場,當這女子是如斯離經叛道,向依保列德作出暗示;而年輕天真的他生性多疑如女生,不懂得如何招架,這或容許菲爾德挽回她的名聲。劇情高潮一刻,泰西忽然回來,菲爾德把自己推進一個極荒誕的死角位置。勇敢示愛似乎與隱藏愛慕同是災難性的行為。此刻的菲爾德,一生彷彿完蛋了,她甚至覺得她比以往更為道德敗壞。教她絕望的是,她發現依保列德不接受她不是因為他喜歡狩獵和享受馳騁,而是他已愛上雅麗斯。菲爾德發現這壞消息時說:「依保列德是有感情的,可惜他眼中從沒有我!」(第四幕第五場)。滿腔怒火、暴跳如雷的她得不到依保列德,轉向泰西誣蔑他的兒子,撒謊說他引誘她在先。泰西怒氣沖沖,即向海神海王星祈求懲罰他的兒子。海王星遂其所願,命令海怪驚嚇依保列德的馬兒,拉著馬車的馬兒與牠們的主人同被殺害。依保列德終死在自己馬兒的蹄下,是他控制範圍以外的事。

戲劇的尾聲,怪物己斷言它的權力。為什麼愛總被認為與禁忌、駭人、亂倫糾纏不清?為什麼去嘗試懺悔是被認為一大災難?

有所遺憾的,或許就是欠缺恩典讓眾角色得以逃脫。劇中常強調太陽的貞潔光芒,代表著理智和啟蒙。菲爾德的死亡,正如她最後的一句台詞,她將所擁有的純潔回饋給白天與太陽。人類,就像是陽光中顯露的污垢。誠然這是可怕的意念,透過菲爾德的父親米諾斯,她更堅稱她父親就是太陽的投射。作為太陽的女兒,她被父親排斥,正如依保列德被他父親詛咒一樣,是荒謬的象徵物。造物主可控制萬物秩序,可殘害怪物,也是一頭怪獸。
ORIGINAL: Phèdre: An Introduction
The subject of Racine’s tragedy, Phèdre (1677), is jealousy, female jealousy – or is it envy? (Is there a difference?) And the subject is also love, which seems to be monstrous. The monstrous contrasts with the play’s classical order and dignity. Its language asserts the necessity for self-control and shows control itself. (In that way, Racine’s constantly dignified, symmetrical verse, is the opposite of Shakespeare’s.) The action is continuous, and the setting is unchanging: everything is ordered, in contrast to the play’s violent passions.

Jean Baptiste Racine (1639-1699) author of some eleven plays, is the outstanding French tragic dramatist, his plays put on at the Hôtel de Bourgogne in Paris, the theatre which was to become France’s national theatre in 1680. Racine himself was brought up by the Jansenists at the abbey of Port-Royal: the Jansenists, though Catholics, taught a Calvinist view of man: that everything man did was damned, and that no deeds of man could ever be justified. Of course, the Jansenists had no time for the theatre, and this opposition to it must have caused a split in Racine’s mind. After Phèdre, he returned to the Jansenists, with their interest in guilt. This is basic to Phèdre’s character (she loves and feels guilty about it), and their interest in the impossibility of finding salvation.

Phèdre is the wife of Theseus, and the sister of Ariadne, who helped Theseus kill the monstrous Minotaur, half bull, half man, in the labyrinth. Theseus deserted Ariadne, and married Phèdre. The woman seems to have everything, but she has seen Hippolytus (Hippolyte, in French), also the son of Theseus, by another wife: Antiope, Queen of the Amazons. And she has fallen in love with him. And the Amazons had no time for any men, until Theseus conquered them. But Hippolytus is widely supposed to care for no woman: he is simply the man who loves the pleasures of hunting, and horses. For the Greeks, to be able to control horses is a sign of controlling passion. In the play by the Greek dramatist, Euripides (484-407 BCE), Hippolytus (428 BCE), from which Racine drew his inspiration, Aphrodite, the goddess of sexual love, punishes Hippolytus’ refusal to love. Hippolytus in Euripides’s tragedy is brought down by the destructive force of passion, which Euripides always thought was dangerous, and a disaster. In Euripides’s play, Phèdre has only a minor part.

In Racine’s play, which has no gods on stage, and no Chorus of women from Trozen, and so is much more tight, and more claustrophobic, Hipplytus falls in love with Aricie, a royal princess of Athens, and a rival to Theseus’s dynasty. Aricie is forbidden to Hippolytus, because she is of a rival family. Hence the irony that runs through the play. Phèdre falls in love with Hippolytus, who is forbidden to her. Hippolytus falls in love with Aricie, who is forbidden to him.

At the beginning of the play, Hippolytus wants to run away from Trozen, south of Athens, because he has seen Aricie, and fears loving her. And he avoids Phèdre, because she is of a rival dynasty to him. But Theseus has disappeared, and the news comes that he has died. Phèdre on the basis of this information, throws caution to the winds, and confesses to Hippolytus that she loves him. It is the most astonishing moment, in Act 2 scene 5, when the woman becomes completely transgressive, in the way she hints things to Hippolytus, and Hippolytus, young and naive and suspicious alike of women and of himself, does not know how to react sensitively, or in a way which allows Phèdre to save her reputation. At that climactic moment, Theseus comes back, and Phèdre has put herself into an impossible position. It seems that frank disclosure of feelings is as disastrous as concealing them: Phèdre is now completely ruined: she feels even more monstrous than she did before. But then she discovers that Hippolytus has rejected her, not because he loves horses, not women, but because he loves Aricie: her moment of discovery is her line: ‘Hippolyte est sensible, et ne sent rien pour moi!’ (Act 4 scene 5) – ‘Hippolytus has feelings, and feels nothing for me!’ In passionate rage and anger that she cannot possess Hippolytus, she tells Theseus that Hippolytus tried to seduce her. Theseus prays to the sea-god, Neptune, to punish his son: Neptune sends a sea-monster, which terrifies Hippolytus’s horses, which are pulling his chariot. Hippolytus is killed because of his own horses, which he cannot control.

By the end of the play, the monstrous has fully asserted its power. But why is love to be thought of as always forbidden, and always monstrous, and liable to be incestuous? Why is it that the attempt to make a confession is always a disaster?

What is missing, it seems, is any means of grace for the characters to escape. All that there is, frequently asserted in the play, is the hard light of the sun, which represents rationality and Enlightenment. Phèdre’s death means that, as she says in her last line, she gives back to the day, and so to the sun, all its purity. Humans, it seems, are the impure stains in the sunlight. It is a frightening idea, the more so as Phèdre can claim, through her father Minos, the sun itself as her father. As the daughter of the sun, she is rejected by her father, as Hippolytus is cursed by his own father, who is therefore himself a monstrous figure. The ruler who controls order, and the monster-slayer, is himself the monster.